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Abstract
This paper studies experimentally how information about rivals’ types affects
bidding behavior in first- and second-price auctions. The comparative static hy-
potheses associated with information about rivals enables us to test the relevance
of such information as well as the general predictions of the auction theory, by
providing an effective means to control for risk aversion and other behavioral mo-
tives that were difficult to control for in previous experiments. Our experimental
evidence provides strong support for the theory, and sheds light on the roles of
risk aversion and the spite motive in first- and second-price auctions, respectively.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies experimentally how bidders’ knowledge of their rivals’ types affects
their behavior in standard auctions. The theoretical relevance of such knowledge has
been established by Kim and Che (2004) (hereafter KC).1 They demonstrated how bid-
ders react differently to the knowledge of their rivals’ types in different auction formats.
In a first-price auction with ex ante symmetric bidders, knowledge about their rivals
causes bidders to refine their bidding strategies based on that knowledge, so any asym-
metry in the bidders’ knowledge about their rivals leads to an inefficient allocation as
well as lower revenue than when the bidders have symmetric information about their
rivals. By contrast, bidders’ knowledge about rivals should have no effect in a second-
price sealed-bid auction since they have a dominant strategy of bidding their valuations.
In fact, KC have identified precise equilibrium strategies in a number of different infor-
mation structures regarding rival types, when the types are uniformly distributed. We
test these predictions.
Testing these predictions can serve several useful purposes. First, bidders’ knowledge
of rivals’ types as well as its asymmetry is quite relevant in various auction settings,
such as procurement contests, privatization, and corporate takeover. These auctions
typically attract bidders with a wide range of backgrounds, differing in previous industry
operation as well as in previous dealings with similar auctions. These differences are
likely to generate asymmetry in bidders’ abilities to assess their rivals’ willingness to
pay. For instance, a radio frequency license auction may attract so-called incumbent
firms as well as relative newcomers; and the incumbents are likely to know more about
other incumbents’ capabilities than those of the newcomers. Empirical testing of the
hypothesized effects will help us not only to learn about the bidding behavior but also
to draw relevant policy implications in these settings.2
1Fang and Morris (2006) also found the relevance of information on rivals in standard auctions.
Their model has two bidders with discrete valuations; each bidder obtains a noisy signal about his
rival’s valuation. Like KC, they find revenue non-equivalence between first-price and second-price
auctions and allocative inefficiency of the first-price auction.
2In addition to the standard policy instruments such as reserve prices and entry fees, the auctioneer
may have some control over what information can be publicly disclosed. For instance, in a corporate
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Second, and perhaps more importantly, the comparative statics hypotheses on how
bidders react to different rival information provide additional restrictions on the theory
unavailable in extant studies, thus enabling us to test more effectively the underlying
behavioral paradigm itself — namely whether bidders behave according to the Nash
hypothesis. For instance, observations on how bidders adjust their strategies to different
information on their rivals in a first-price auction can produce much sharper identifica-
tion on whether bidders follow the Nash paradigm than previous experiments measuring
the degree of bid shading or ones comparing the revenue between first- and second-price
auctions. Examining the amounts of bid shading may not effectively distinguish the Nash
behavior from, say, an alternative hypothesis that bidders follow a naive rule of thumb.
Likewise, revenue comparison across auction formats may be subject to risk aversion
and other behavioral motives that may affect the formats differently but are difficult
to control for in an empirical setting.3 Further, the celebrated dominance hypothesis
in a second-price auction can be tested more effectively when bidders are subject to
additional information that should not affect their behavior if the hypothesis were true.
Finally, our rich comparative statics hypotheses can provide a better handle on such
uncontrollables as bidder risk aversion or “behavioral” motives, and may thus clarify
some of the anomalies observed in the past auction experiments. In particular, they
reported overbidding in first- and second-price auctions relative to theoretical predic-
tions. While bidders’ risk aversion and their strategic mistakes or their “spite” motive
have been blamed for the overbidding respectively in the first- and second-price auc-
tions, there has been disagreement in the literature on their effects.4 The change in
takeover, the degree to which the target firm’s financial status and dealings are revealed can be a choice
variable. A similar choice is available in the sale of real estate, e.g., condominiums, in terms of the specific
location, blue prints and orientation. The information on these aspects often has different implications
for different bidders, much as assumed in the model of KC. See Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2003) and
Eso and Szentes (2006) on the theoretical analysis of the issue.
3Risk aversion may affect the revenue performance of a first-price auction, but not that of a second-
price auction (given the dominance of bidding one’s valuation in the latter). Meanwhile, a loser’s ability
to influence the selling price in the latter may lead to “spite”-motivated overbidding there, but not in
a first-price auction.
4See Kagel (1995) for the debates and tests conducted on these issues. While the spite motive has
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information about rivals can serve as a useful instrument to control for the presence of
risk aversion in the case of first-price auction and to clarify the validity of the competing
explanations for overbidding in the second-price auction.
To test these hypotheses properly, not only must the researcher have clear knowl-
edge of the information bidders have about their rivals, but the nature of the bidders’
information must also conform to that assumed in the model. While these features are
unlikely to be met in real auctions (and the data), a lab experiment can easily be de-
signed to replicate the precise information structures assumed in the model. For this
reason, we adopt a lab experiment as a method of test.
In the experiment, subjects play a sequence of auctions with increasingly more infor-
mation about their rivals’ types. More specifically, each round of an experiment selects a
set of four bidders to play three auction games. The profile of valuations stays the same
for each auction, but the information changes. In Auction 1, each bidder is informed
only of his own valuation (and only of the distributions of their rivals’ valuations). In
Auction 2, while keeping the same valuation profile, each set of four bidders is partitioned
into two “knowledge” groups of two, and an auction game is played with each bidder
informed of his within-group rival’s valuation as well as his own. Finally, in Auction
3 bidders are informed of valuations of all four bidders, again with the same valuation
profile. The information about winners for all three auctions is announced only after
the bidders complete the entire 3 auction cycle, so that no inference about their rivals’
valuations (other than the ones disclosed by design) can be made. These experiments
were performed for both first- and second-price auctions.
We test two sets of hypotheses, one for bidders’ equilibrium behavior and the other
for revenue and efficiency performance of the standard auctions. First, to test for the
bidding behavior in the first-price auction, we conduct a structural regression analysis
based on the explicit equilibrium bidding function obtained for the uniform distribution
not been addressed recently (apart from this paper), recent contributions have supported risk aversion,
conditional on utility of the constant relative risk averse form, u(pi) = pir. Chen and Plott (1998) and
Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey (2002) find r ≈ 0.5. Reanalyzing the data of Dyer, Kagel and Levine (1989),
Bajari and Hortacsu (2004) find r ≈ 0.25. Using data from US Forest Service auctions, Campo, et al.
(2002) find r ≈ 0.6.
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case. As for the second-price auction, a reduced form regression, where bids are regressed
on the varying set of bidders’ private information, is employed to test whether knowledge
of rivals’ valuations affects the bidding behavior.
Another set of hypotheses deals with the effect on the expected revenue and allocative
efficiency. In a first-price auction, revenue as well as efficiency varies non-monotonically,
dropping initially as bidders’ information about rivals shifts from no information (Auc-
tion 1) to information about one rival (Auction 2) but rising thereafter when it shifts to
information about all rivals (Auction 3). By contrast, no change in revenue or efficiency
is predicted for the second-price auction. Given the simple and explicit form of equi-
librium bidding function found in the case of the uniform distribution and risk neutral
bidders, we can obtain quantitative measures of revenue and surplus for both auction
formats. These measures are then used to check how closely the theory approximates
the real data.
These hypotheses receive strong support from our experimental data. The observed
patterns of bid shading relative to own valuations as well as of the adjustment of bids to
the learning of rivals’ types in a first-price auction matched closely those predicted by
the theory. The experiment on the second-price auction lends support to the dominance
hypothesis, as a large portion of subjects bid close to their valuations and do not display
much sensitivity to the information about their rivals. As with the extant auction
experiments, some overbidding was observed in both formats, while some underbidding
was observed in a second-price auction. Overbidding was more pronounced in a first-price
auction when the valuation of the main competitor is unknown, which lends credence
to the view that risk aversion is a source of overbidding. In a second-price auction,
underbidding dissipates in later rounds, indicating that strategic mistakes may have
been a factor, but overbidding remained a pattern throughout. Moreover, overbidding
is more pronounced when a bidder is convinced of losing and in a position to set the
selling price, and concentrated at levels slightly below the highest valuation (i.e., the
likely winner’s bid). This pattern suggests the presence of a “spite” motive behind
overbidding.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the theoretical
results and presents testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes an experiment designed to
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test them. Section 4 reports experimental results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theory Review and Testable Hypotheses
A unit of a good is auctioned off to n ≥ 2 risk-neutral bidders each with a valuation
drawn uniformly from [0, 1]. The valuation distribution is common knowledge to all bid-
ders, but bidders may know the realized valuations of some rivals. Formally, bidders are
partitioned into “knowledge groups” such that they know the realized valuations of the
rivals within the same group, while they know only the distribution of types for bidders
outside their group. This partition model is convenient for modeling different informa-
tion structures regarding rivals’ types. Suppose that n bidders are partitioned into k
knowledge groups of m bidders in each group, a situation called a “k ×m partition.”5
For the current experiment, we assume n = 4 and focus on three partition structures:
4× 1, 2× 2 and 1× 4. The 4× 1 partition, labeled Auction 1, involves no information
about rivals and corresponds to the the standard assumption invoked in the auction
literature; the 2 × 2 partition, labeled Auction 2, involves an intermediate situation in
which each bidder knows the valuation of only one rival; and 1 × 4 partition, labeled
Auction 3, involves full information about rivals’ valuations, i.e., a Bertrand game. Of
particular interest is how bidders react as more information about rivals is revealed, via
a shift from Auction 1 to Auction 2, and from Auction 2 to Auction 3.
For each partition, we study a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of each auction game in
undominated strategies. Excluding weakly dominated strategies serves the purpose of
pruning out unreasonable equilibria present in a Bertrand game and a second-price
auction.6 The following hypotheses are derived from KC (2004).
5KC (2004) consider an arbitrary partition structure, including possibly an asymmetric structure.
Assuming symmetry in the partition structure yields a closed-form characterization of equilibrium,
which is convenient for the purposes of an experiment.
6A Bertrand game has equilibria in which the stronger bidder bids strictly higher than the valuation
of second-highest valuation bidder, for fear of the latter bidding above his valuation. Meanwhile, a
second-price auction admits equilibria in which the strongest bidder loses to a weaker bidder bidding
strictly higher than his valuation. Both types of equilibria are supported by weakly dominated strategies,
however.
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2.1 Equilibrium Behavior in the First-Price Auction
In a first-price auction, bidders shade their bids to obtain a surplus upon winning, and
the amount of shading depends on rivals’ bidding behavior. If the rivals bid aggressively,
then a bidder may not shade much, for instance. By the same token, bidders facing rivals
with high valuations may bid more aggressively. For this reason, knowing rivals’ types
leads bidders to alter the extent to which they shade their bids. This is the main feature
of equilibrium prediction described below.
For the case of a k × m partition with valuations drawn uniformly from [0, 1], we
have a closed-form characterization for the equilibrium bidding strategies. To describe
the latter, it is useful to distinguish a bidder with the highest valuation and the one with
the second highest valuation in a group, respectively called “leader” and “follower.” In
the trivial case m = 1, each group has only one bidder, so he will be treated as a leader.
We begin with the leader’s strategy:7
• First-Price Bidding by Leaders (FPBL): Consider a k×m partition such that








where vf is set equal to 0 when m = 1.
The proof of this proposition can be found in the appendix. According to this propo-
sition, a leader bids between his valuation and the second highest valuation within
his group in a particular fashion: he combines the bidding strategy familiar from the
standard first-price auction with a Bertrand behavior. Specifically, a leader follows an
unconstrained bidding strategy, βm` (v`) ≡ n−mn−m+1v`, which depends only on his valuation,
except when the follower’s valuation, vf , “binds” in the sense that β
m
` (v`) falls short of
vf . In the latter case, the leader adopts the Bertrand behavior, matching the following
7This assumes that ties are broken in favor of the leader (see KC [2004]), for a similar reason that the
tie-breaking rule is adopted in a Bertrand game. This tie-breaking rule is not necessary, though, if the
valuations are discrete, as is the case with our experiment. For this reason, the issue of the tie-breaking
rule does not arise in our experiment; and we simply adopt the usual random tie-breaking rule.
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valuation precisely.8 Interestingly, the unconstrained strategy βm` (v`) is precisely the
strategy a bidder would adopt in a standard first-price auction with n−m+ 1 bidders,
with no information about rivals (i.e., (n−m + 1)× 1 partition). That is, if “not con-
strained” by the group members, a leader acts as if there are only n−m outsider rivals,
completely ignoring the m− 1 within-group rivals.
Inspecting how the leader’s bidding strategy changes with the information structure
reveals several testable hypotheses. Fixing n = 4, we can write the leader’s equilibrium
strategy in auction a = 1, 2, 3 as
ba` (v`, vf ) = max{Ba1v`, Ba2vf}.
Then, FPBL yields the following predictions on the coefficients, Ba1 and B
a
2 .
• FPBL1: The coefficients Ba1 and Ba2 in a leader’s equilibrium strategy take the fol-
lowing values in auction a = 1, 2, 3:9







Ba2 n/a 1 1
Notice that a shift from Auction 1 to Auction 2 causes group leaders to bid less
aggressively, unless constrained by the followers’ valuations.
FPBL further generates implications on how the leader would react to knowledge of
the follower’s valuation once it becomes known to him.
• FPBL2: For Auction a = 2, 3, the following holds:




1v` > vf (2)




1v` < vf . (3)
8When the valuation support is discrete, as in our experiment, a Bertrand behavior will be to match
the follower’s valuation or bid a unit above that valuation, depending on the fineness of the support.
9Auction 1 has no follower, so B12 is not well defined. The coefficient B
3
1 can be any value that
satisfies B31v` ≤ B32vf .
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According to FPBL2, if a bidder realizes that he bid higher than the highest rival
valuation in his group in Auction 1 (i.e., without knowing the rival valuations), he adjusts
his bid downward in Auction 2 and 3 (i.e., after realizing those rival valuations). On
the other hand, if he realizes that he bid less than some valuations of his within-group
rivals and his valuation exceeds these rival valuations, then he adjusts his bid upward
to match the highest within-group rival valuation. As will be seen, the design of our
experiment will enable us to test this particular hypothesis.
FPBL can also be tested based on its implication on the correlation between a leader’s
bid and a follower’s valuation:
• FPBL3: An Auction 2 leader’s Auction 2 bid is more highly correlated with the
valuation of the follower in his group than is his Auction 1 bid. The Auction 3 leader’s bid
is more highly correlated with the Auction 3 follower’s valuation than his own valuation.
Despite the independence in valuation distribution, there is a selection-induced cor-
relation between an Auction 2 leader’s Auction 1 bid and his follower’s valuation: The
higher the leader’s valuation, the higher the within-group follower’s valuation is likely
to be, simply because the support of the latter is chosen conditionally on the former’s
valuation. Since the former’s equilibrium bidding strategy in Auction 1 is monotone in-
creasing in his valuation, there exists a positive correlation between the two values. This
correlation is again present in Auction 2 between the two values, but there is a tighter
correlation due to the Bertrand effect, which arises whenever the follower’s valuation
is binding. In Auction 3, the correlation coefficient between the leader’s bid and the
follower’s valuation becomes 1, implying that the leader’s bid is more highly correlated
with the follower’s valuation than his own valuation. These relationships between cor-
relation coefficients provides an additional way of testing if a leader’s bidding strategy
adjusts to his rival information according to the theoretical predictions.
Next, we turn to the equilibrium predictions for the follower.
• First-Price Bidding by Followers (FPBF): In a first-price auction, a follower
bids no higher than his valuation in Auctions 2 and 3.
9
A follower’s equilibrium strategy is not pinned down in the Bertrand-type situation
wherein the leader bids the follower’s valuation, in both Auctions 2 and 3. It is an
equilibrium behavior for the follower to bid below his valuation with some probability,
since the follower earns zero payoff in equilibrium and the leader will not be tempted
to deviate as long as the follower puts a sufficient probability mass/density close to his
valuation.10 In Auction 2, if a group leader bids strictly above the follower’s valuation
(i.e., the latter is not binding), any bid below the follower’s valuation can be an equi-
librium response. Such a multiplicity should be taken into account when interpreting
experimental data. This multiplicity issue aside, a Bertrand game presents an additional
difficulty in interpreting the follower’s behavior. As is well known, a follower does not
have a unique best response (even when he has a unique equilibrium response); any bid
below or equal to his valuation would be optimal.
Remark 1 (Risk aversion) One element of the theory that cannot be replicated in an
experiment is the risk neutrality of bidders, for the risk attitudes of the subjects cannot
be controlled.11 Nevertheless, our hypotheses provide a better handle on this issues than
in the previous studies. First, Bertrand behavior is not subject to bidders’ risk attitudes,
so the follower’s behavior in FPBF and the dependence of a leader’s bid on the follower’s
valuation — coefficients B22 and B
3
2 — are robust to the risk aversion issue. Likewise,
the qualitative response by a leader to the rival information, as described in FPBL2 and
FPBL3, are robust to the bidders’ risk attitudes. The only elements of the predictions that
are susceptible to risk aversion are the two coefficients B11 and B
2
1 , i.e., the dependence
10In fact, given a random tie-breaking rule and a continuous strategy space, any equilibrium response
by the follower must involve randomizing below his valuation (See Blume (2003)). Given a discrete
strategy space (which is more relevant for our experiment), bidding one’s valuation with probability
one can be supported as an equilibrium (if the leader bids a unit above it with probability one), but
bidding below his valuation can be also supported as an equilibrium.
11There is considerable debate in experimental circles about whether this is in fact true. An influential
paper by Roth and Malouf (1979) provides a methodology for inducing risk neutrality by paying subjects
with lottery tickets over a binary lottery, rather than cash. The reasoning is that even risk averse people
are risk neutral in probability. Very few studies have directly tested the efficacy of the Roth-Malouf
technique. Selten, Sadrieh, and Abbink (1999) summarize the literature and conduct a direct test.
They are harshly critical of the method, suggesting it makes inference even more difficult.
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of a leader’s bid on his own valuation in Auctions 1 and 2. Risk aversion of a bidder
will imply overbidding relative to the theoretical predictions in this case, thus higher
estimated values of the coefficients than the respective predictions, 3/4 and 2/3. In fact,
the pattern of overbidding can help reveal its source in testing risk aversion, for instance,
against a possible alternative hypothesis of a “joy-of-winning bias.” If risk aversion is at
work, then bidders face more uncertainty in Auctions 1 and 2 relative to Auction 3, so
the overbidding would be more pronounced in former auctions than in the latter, whereas
the joy-of-winning hypothesis would imply no such pattern of overbidding. In fact, the
latter theory may imply even deviations from the Bertrand behavior.
2.2 Equilibrium Behavior in the Second-Price Auction
In a private value environment, it is well-known that bidders in a second-price auction
(or English auction) have a weakly dominant strategy of bidding their valuations. The
weak dominance of this “truthful bidding” means that, unlike in a first-price auction,
information about rivals’ valuations should have no impact on bidding behavior in a
second-price auction.
• Second-Price Bidding (SPB): (Truthful bidding) In a second-price auction, the
bidders bid their valuations, regardless of the partition structure.
As mentioned above, subjecting bidders to different information about rivals provides
a tighter identifying restriction than has been available in past experiments, thus helping
to test the validity of the dominance hypothesis.
Remark 2 (Strategic mistakes, spite motive, joy of winning) Overbidding has
been observed in previous experiments of second-price auctions (e.g., Kagel, Harstad and
Levin, 1989; Kagel and Levin, 1993). Such deviations from weakly dominant strategies
may result from computational mistakes on the part of the bidders or from their bias
toward winning. For instance, Kagel et al. found the disappearance of overbidding with
English auctions, which would suggest that difficulty of figuring out the Vickrey auction
as a reason for observed overbidding in the second-price auction. Alternatively, the
deviations may be attributed to behavioral motives such as “spite.” For instance, Morgan,
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Steiglitz, and Reis (2003) suggested that bidders may have an incentive to hurt their rivals
by raising bids above their valuations in case they lose. Finally, the overbidding can be
simply explained as extra utility premium subjects may attach to winning an auction
(“joy of winning”).12 Our model can provide an additional opportunity to gain better
understanding of the source of overbidding to the extent that overbidding is a systematic
phenomenon. Different theories of overbidding have different predictions about when a
bidder is more likely to overbid and how he/she would do so. For instance, spite will
be a likely motive for overbidding, if overbidding is more pronounced (1) when a bidder
is a follower — namely one who is convinced of losing and is in a position to hurt the
winner, (2) when a leader’s valuation is known (since a follower can safely inflate the
selling price without risking an unprofitable win), and (3) when a follower bids slightly
less than the leader’s valuation. No such pattern of overbidding relative to a bidder’s
identity or to the knowledge about rival types is expected if the reason behind overbidding
were strategic mistakes. Further, the ‘strategic mistakes’ theory would imply that the
overbidding will abate as bidders gain more experience whereas the spiteful overbidding
need not diminish with experience. Finally, joy of winning will be evidenced by bids above
leaders’ valuations. These aspects of behavior will be examined in Section 4.
2.3 Revenue and Surplus Performances
We can draw revenue and surplus implications from the bidding behavior presented
above. In a second-price auction, SPB immediately implies the following hypothesis:
• Second-Price Revenue and Surplus (SPRS): A second-price auction generates
the same full surplus and revenue irrespective of the partition structure.
By contrast, in a first-price auction the dependence of a bidder’s equilibrium bid on
his within-group rivals’ valuations means that the information about rivals’ types has
a nontrivial impact on the surplus and revenue. Clearly, in Auction 1 (no information
about rivals) and Auction 3 (full information about rivals) the good is allocated efficiently
12In a recent experiment of second-price auction, based on the model of Fang and Morris (2006),
Cooper and Fang (2006) observe overbidding behavior and ascribe it to a (modified) joy of winning
motive.
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and the revenue equals the second-highest valuation. In auction 2 (i.e., 2× 2 partition),
the leaders of the two groups will likely bid different amounts, even when they have the
same valuation, if they face within-group rivals with different valuations. Hence, the
allocation is generally inefficient, and KC (2004) show that this inefficiency leads to a
lower expected revenue than in Auction 1 or 3. The result is summarized as follows:13
• First-Price Revenue and Surplus (FPRS): A first-price auction generates the
same full surplus and revenue in Auction 1 and Auction 3. The total surplus and expected
revenue are strictly lower in Auction 2.
FPRS implies that total surplus and revenue vary non-monotonically with a shift from
Auction 1 through Auction 2 to Auction 3. They first drop when the partition structure
shifts from “no information about rivals” to “information about some rivals,” and they
rise back to the original levels with the shift to “full information about rivals.”
Remark 3 Bidder risk aversion will affect the revenue and surplus implications in a
first-price auction. As mentioned earlier, though, the effect varies across the information
structures. Risk aversion should have no effect in Auction 3, will cause leaders to overbid
when followers’ valuations are not binding in Auction 2, and it will cause all bidders to
overbid in Auction 1. Consequently, even with a bidder risk aversion the prediction of a
revenue decrease from a shift to Auction 1 to Auction 2 should not be affected, whereas
the predicted revenue rise when moving from Auction 2 to Auction 3 may be dampened
or reversed. Finally, overbidding may arise in a second price auction, for the reason
described above. If a spite motive is present, the overbidding will be more pronounced as
more information about rivals becomes available, causing the revenue to rise with a shift
from Auction 1 to Auction 2, and to Auction 3.
13It is well-known that first- and second-price auctions are revenue equivalent in Auctions 1 and
3. It then follows from above that the second-price auction yields higher revenue than the first-price
auction in Auction 2 (see KC (2004)). While this latter result can be tested in principle, the magnitude
of revenue difference may not be sufficiently large to ensure a meaningful test. Moreover, revenue
comparisons across different formats are susceptible to risk aversion and other behavioral issues that
cannot be controlled by an experiment and can affect the formats differently. Revenue equivalence
in the standard symmetric independent-private-values environment has not been reliably confirmed or
refuted for this reason (see Kagel (1995)).
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3 Experiment Design
Each session of the experiment involved 20 subjects playing 30 rounds of auction games.
We ran two sessions each of the first- and second-price auctions, for a total of 80 subjects.
The subjects were volunteers from undergraduate economics courses. Each session lasted
less than two hours. Subjects were each given $4.96 in their earnings account at the
start of the experiment (62 tokens, valued at $0.08 each), to which their earnings in the
auctions were added or subtracted. Subjects earned on average $32.66 (s.d. $12.45),
ranging from a maximum of $70.84 to a minumum of $2.96. All subjects finished the
experiment with positive balances in their earnings accounts.
In each round, the 20 subjects were randomly divided into 5 cohorts of 4 bidders.
These 4 bidders then played Auction 1 (4 × 1 partition), Auction 2 (2 × 2 partition),
and Auction 3 (1× 4 partition) of a given format sequentially, using an (extended) dual
market technique. More specifically, in any given round, bidders were initially assigned
valuations drawn from the uniform distribution over integers ranging from 0 to 100,
and these same valuation profiles were kept throughout that round. Keeping the same
valuations while changing the information each bidder has about their rivals enables us
to isolate the effect of the rival information, thus preserving the “purity of the ceteris
paribus presumption” (see Kagel, 1995). Hence, the (extended) dual market technique
makes the testing of our comparative static hypotheses more effective. To maintain
the assumed informational structure, bidders were informed of the outcome of all three
auctions only at the end of the round, when all three auctions were concluded.
The bidders’ identities were unknown to all other bidders to prevent repeated-game
effects. The winning bid, the price, and the winner’s profit were posted at the end of
each round for all three auctions. The valuations assigned to bidders as well as their
bids were in discrete integer (or token) units ranging from 1 to 100 with no ceiling on
a possible bid. A single token was exchanged for 8 cents, meaning that a subject could
earn at most 8 dollars in a given auction game, and 24 dollars in any session. A copy of
the instructions can be obtained from the authors.14
14See http://econ.ucsd.edu/˜jandreon/, http://www.columbia.edu/˜yc2271/, or http://eclass.yonsei.
ac.kr/jikimdir/ to download the instructions.
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Since each of the 30 rounds contained 3 auctions and 5 distinct groups, each session
included 150 auctions of each of the three types. We ran two sessions for each of the
first- and second-price auctions, thus we obtained 300 observations for each partition of
first-price and second-price auctions.
4 Results
We now present the results of our experiment. We first examine the bidding behavior
in the first and second price auctions, and then move on to the revenue and surplus in
these formats.
4.1 Bidding Behavior in the First-Price Auction
We begin with the most general prediction, FPBL3. Table 1 reports the correlation co-
efficients between group leaders’ bids and their valuations and that between the leaders’
bids and their group followers’ valuations. It confirms the hypotheses that the corre-
lation between a leaders’ bids and followers’ valuations rises from Auction 1 (0.38) to
Auction 2 (0.57). Note also that in Auction 3, the correlation between the leader’s bid
and valuation (0.59) is less than the correlation between the leader’s valuation and the
follower’s valuation (0.86), as hypothesized in FPBL3.
Next, Table 2 presents the results of the regression equations discussed in FPBL1:
bai = max{Ba1v`, Ba2vf}+ εai (4)
for Auction a = 1, 2, 3. We assume that error terms, εai , are independent across bidders
and rounds. One possible interpretation of the errors is that they represent random mis-
takes in calculating the optimal bids. We employed the non-linear least squares method
based on (4). The coefficients estimated show how the subjects adjust their bids in
response to the information gained about their rivals’ types. Overall, the estimated
coefficients closely track the theoretical predictions in FPBL1. In particular, the coeffi-
cients on the followers’ valuations, B22 and B
3
2 , are almost exactly 1, which is strikingly
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consistent with Bertrand behavior.15 The coefficients on own valuations, B11 ≈ 0.79 and
B21 ≈ 0.70, are greater than their predictions, 3/4 and 2/3, by about 0.04. The overbid-
ding, while small in average magnitude, is significant at p ≤ 0.001.16 As mentioned in
Remark 1, this pattern of overbidding — namely that overbidding is captured only in
the coefficients B11 and B
2
1 — is consistent with the presence of bidder risk aversion.
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More importantly, the decrease in the coefficient on the bidder’s own valuation when
shifting from Auction 1 and Auction 2 confirms that the bidders shade more when they
realize that within-group rivals have sufficiently low valuations, which is again consistent
with the way bidders were hypothesized to react to the knowledge of their rivals’ types.
Hence, these results favor a theory of risk aversion over joy-of-winning bias.18
Table 4 further tests the implications on the leader’s bidding behavior in the first-
price auction. The leaders are shown to bid between their valuations and those of the
followers 89% of the time. The leaders’ adjustment of bids to the rivals’ valuations hy-
pothesized in (2) and (3) also receives some support. When realizing that their Auction
1 bids were higher than their follower’s valuations (i.e., b1 > v2+1), the leaders lowered
their Auction 2 bids 63% of the time—to lower unconstrained bids for 49.2% of the time
and to followers’ valuations for 12.5% of the time. In the case that leaders’ Auction 1
bids were less than their followers’ valuations (i.e., b1 ≤ v2 + 1), a significant portion
(about 54%) of leaders raised their bids up to the followers’ valuations, as hypothesized
in (3).
Turning to Auction 3, Table 4 largely supports the hypothesized Bertrand behavior,
from both leaders and followers. Specifically, about 61 percent of the leaders’ bids match
the equilibrium predictions.19 About 48 percent of the followers’ bids match the Bertrand




16For B11 , we find t = 6.16, and for B
2
1 , we find t = 4.920. Both t-tests are significant beyond the
0.001 level.
17Assuming CRRA utility, u(pi) = pir, Cox, et al. (1988) have shown that the bid coefficients should
be B1(v, n) = (n− 1)v/(n− r), where n is 4 in Auction 1 and 3 in Auction 2. Our estimates would be
consistent with r ≈ 0.2.
18This concurs with Goeree, Holt and Palfrey (2002) who jointly test CRRA preferences and joy-of-
winning, and find no significant joy-of-winning bias.
19Of the leaders’ bids consistent with the Bertrand behavior, 20 percent of the bids equal the second
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predictions in the strong sense that they are equal to or a unit below their valuations.20
This is remarkable given that followers’ equilibrium responses/best responses are not
unique in a Bertrand game. As mentioned in Subsection 2.2, any bids below or equal to
ones’ valuations are optimal and can be equilibrium behavior. In light of this, about 92
percent of all followers’ bids are consistent with equilibrium/optimizing behavior.
4.2 Bidding Behavior in the Second-Price Auction
Table 5 presents the distribution of bids that match the dominance hypothesis and those
displaying deviations, and shows the patterns of the deviations. About 77 percent of
total bids in Auction 1 are consistent with truthful bidding. The proportion of truthful
bids falls to 66% in Auction 2 and to 58% in Auction 3, showing that violations of
the dominance hypothesis are more pronounced when information about more rivals is
learned. At the same time, the proportion of truthful bids remains high among leaders
in Auctions 2 and 3 (78.7% and 67.2%, respectively), particularly in the last 10 rounds
(88.2% and 72.0%, respectively). Of nontruthful bids, there are more overbids than
underbids, but both types of deviations are more pronounced as we shift from Auction
1 to Auction 2 and to Auction 3. The underbids dissipate significantly in the last 10
rounds, whereas the overbids do not show any systematic dissipation in the later rounds.
The dissipation of the underbids suggests that a large portion of the underbids may have
been caused by mistakes in strategic considerations, which are corrected as one gains
more experience. Meanwhile, the persistence of overbidding warrants careful analysis.
Toward this end, we examine the pattern of overbidding, paying special attention to
when a bidder is more likely to overbid and how much he/she overbids relative to rival
bidders’ valuations. Table 5 shows that an increase in overbids is most pronounced when
the followers learn the leaders’ valuations. The non-leaders’ overbids increase by about
18% going from Auction 1 (13.8%) to 2 (31.6%). Also, the overbids by those who are
leaders in Auction 2 but not in Auction 3 increase by about 18% going from Auction 2
highest values and the others are a unit above them.
20Of such bids by the followers, about half of them equal the followers’ valuations and the other half
a unit below them.
17
(10.2%) to Auction 2 (28.5%). While the modest overbidding found in Auction 1 may
be explainable by strategic mistakes, the dramatic increase in overbidding among the
non-leaders in Auctions 2 and 3 appears to indicate the presence of spite, since raising
bids to hurt the winner becomes less risky when a follower learns of his group leader’s
valuation (and thus his likely bid).21 The presence of the spite motive is also revealed in
a questionnaire administered to the subjects after the experiment. In the questionnaire,
subjects were asked whether they ever bid more than their valuations. If they had
overbid, then they were asked, in an open-ended question, to explain why. Examining
the answers reveals that out of 40 participants, 24 report having overbid and half of them
volunteered that they did so to reduce the earnings of winners. Some participants even
reported that they only overbid if they are in a ‘losing situation.’ This is remarkable
since our questionnaire never suggested any reasons to subjects.
The bidding pattern in a second-price auction can also be learned from reduced-form
regressions of bids in Auction 2 and 3:
bai = A+B
a
1 · vi +Ba2 · vm(i),
where bai is bidder i’s bid in Auction a = 2, 3, vi is his valuation, and vm(i) is the highest
valuation in his group except for his own. The estimation results are reported in Table
6.22 For the leaders, the estimate of the own valuation coefficient Ba1 is close to, and not
significantly different from, 1 in both Auction 2 and Auction 3, but the coefficient on the
highest rival’s valuation Ba2 is close to zero and insignificant for both auctions, as are the
constant terms A.23 This indicates that the leaders bid close to their valuations and do
not adjust their bids to the rivals’ valuations. Hence, the dominance hypothesis receives
21Bidders with low valuations are unlikely to win, so they may be more likely to commit strategic
errors. Since these bidders are also more likely to be non-leaders, “errors” theory could explain an
increase in the frequency of overbids by non-leaders in Auctions 2 and 3, relative to the overall frequency
of overbids in Auction 1. Notice, however, that the increase in overbids reported in Table 5 restricts
attention to the same set of bidders, with their valuations held fixed. Hence, the selection bias cannot
explain the increase.
22We ran a supplementary regression with a random-effects model to account for the individual
characteristics without finding the regression results much different from those of OLS regressions.
23Testing the null hypothesis Ba1 = 1,we have for leaders B
2
1 = 0.98, t = 0.83 and B
3
1 = 0.83, t = 1.70
while for followers we have B21 = 0.70, t = 7.05 and B
3
1 = 0.68, t = 4.10.
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compelling support for the case of leaders. By contrast, the followers’ bids show more
sensitivity to the highest rivals’ bids (B22 is 0.07 and marginally significant, while B
3
2 is
0.20 and significant). In particular, the high coefficient on vm(i) in Auction 3 indicates
that a bidder is willing to raise his bid most significantly relative to the leader’s valuation
when safe with the knowledge that he will not be winning and his bid will set the selling
price.24 Meanwhile, the second and third followers’ bids in Auction 3 do not exhibit any
appreciable sensitivity to the leaders’ valuations.25 This lack of sensitivity is consistent
with the fact that their bids, unlike the followers’, are unlikely to set the prices winners
will pay. From this perspective, the overbids made by the second and third followers
may be best explained as strategic mistakes.
The distribution of overbids among followers can yield further insights about the
various explanations for overbidding. Table 7 and Figure 1 report the frequency of over-
bids, organizing the overbids by how close the follower’s bid is to the leaders valuation.
Notice that 90% of the overbids do not exceed the group leader’s valuation. This all
but rules out “joy of winning” as a major cause of overbidding, since at most 10% of
overbids are explainable by that motive. More telling of the likely cause of overbidding
is the large spike just below the leaders’ valuations. Specifically, 19% of overbids are 1
unit below the leaders’ valuations and 17 % are between 2 and 5 units below the leaders’
valuations. This concentration of overbids just below leaders’ valuations are suggestive
of the intention by followers to limit the surplus accruing to the leaders.
The alternative motives are, of course, not mutually exclusive. The same subject may
adopt different motives depending on the circumstances. In this regard, the individual
distribution of overbids in Table 7 gives a richer portrayal of behavioral patterns and
motives. In particular, the behavior of several bidders (subjects #1, 12, 13, 16, 17, 13,
26,, 27, 28, 29, 40) appears consistent with spite; overbids by a few bidders (subjects #12,
14, 15, 21, and 37) appears motivated by the joy of winning; and the more disbursed
distributions of overbids among a few bidders (subjects #6, 18, 20, 31, 39, and 39)
24In Auction 2, a follower knows that he will not be winning but he does not know his bid will set
the selling price, due to the uncertainty about the types of the other group bidders.
25The estimates of B32 for these bidders are 0.096 and 0.072, respectively, and the hypothesis that
this values are zero cannot be rejected at 95% probability.
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appears consistent with the errors hypothesis.
4.3 Revenue and Surplus Performances
We now turn to the revenue and surplus performances of the two auctions. While the
bidding behavior results reported above yield an immediate implications for revenues,
their implications for allocative efficiencies are not clear. We begin with Table 8 which
presents the theoretical predictions for revenue and surplus based on the actual valuation
profiles as realized in the experiment.26 Note that the predicted effects of the rival
information on the revenue and surplus in both auctions are small in magnitude relative
to the natural variance found in the data. Therefore, we would not expect effects to be
statistically significant.
Table 9 reports the actual revenue and surplus from the first-price auctions under
different information structures. The revenue results track the bidding behavior reported
earlier. Namely, the revenue difference (of about 3.3 in token units) between Auction 1
and Auction 2 is in the right direction, consistent with FPRS, but more than doubles the
amount predicted by the theory (about 1.5). The revenue ranking between Auctions 2
and 3 is contrary to the prediction, although not significant. Again risk aversion accounts
for this deviation from predictions. As noted in Remark 1, risk aversion causes bidders
to be more aggressive when facing more uncertainties, which could explain the amplified
revenue ranking between Auctions 1 and 2 and the reversal of the predicted ranking
between Auction 2 and 3. Total surplus should be less susceptible to the risk aversion
effect if the degree of risk aversion is similar across the bidders. Indeed, the surplus
rankings across different information structures are consistent with FPRS, exhibiting
the non-monotonicity, though not significantly.
Table 10 reports the revenue and surplus observed from our second-price auction
experiment. Their theoretical predictions are the same as those in Auctions 1 and
26In a Bertrand situation arising in Auction 2 and Auction 3, there are two pure strategy equilibria
where a leader’s bid is either the second highest value or one unit above it. We presume the two
equilibrium prices to be equally probable, thus taking the second highest value plus a half token unit
as our theoretical prediction.
20
3 of a first-price auction (in Table 8). According to SPRS, the revenue and surplus
should not depend on the information structure. This hypothesis is rejected for nearly
all the binary comparisons, as shown in the Table 10. Indeed, Table 10 shows that
revealing information about more rivals to the bidders results in higher revenue and,
less significantly, lower surplus. This behavior seems consistent with aforementioned
overbidding by the followers, which becomes more pronounced as they gain information
about rivals. In a second-price auction, a follower’s overbidding raises the selling price
(and thus revenue) and this can cause an inefficient allocation if a leader underbids.27
5 Concluding Remarks
We have studied experimentally the effect bidder’s information about rivals’ types has on
bidding behavior in both first- and second-price auctions. The results of the experiment
appear to support the hypotheses adapted from KC (2004). In the experiments on
the first-price auction, subjects’ bidding behavior relative to their valuations as well
as their adjustments of bids to the information about their rivals appears to closely
match the pattern predicted by theory. In particular, the structural estimation shows
that subjects’ behavior in a Bertrand setting (in Auctions 2 and 3) approximated the
theoretical predictions quite closely, and their bidding in non-Bertrand setting is also
consistent with the theory once the risk aversion effect accounted for. Our experiment
on second-price auctions also confirmed important elements of the theory. In particular,
bidders appeared to largely follow the dominant strategy of bidding their valuations,
except when they become convinced of losing an auction and are in a position to influence
the selling price. Subjects tended to overbid in the latter setting, which seems consistent
with the spite motive theory.
The comparative statics hypotheses provide additional restrictions on the theory that
are largely robust to risk aversion and other behavioral motives that some past auction
experiments were susceptible to. Thus, our experimental support of the theory appears
27Note that a defensive action against spiteful opponents is for leader to bid below his valuation (but
above the follower’s) thus putting spiteful followers at risk. Unfortunately, we have no way of testing
this “reciprocal spite” motive in our data.
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to provide a more compelling endorsement for the underlying game-theoretic paradigm
as a behavioral framework than has been possible with previous auction experiments.
Further, the enhanced control on the behavioral issues and risk attitudes could provide
a better understanding on the roles they play in auction experiments. In particular,
our study adds credibility to the view that risk aversion may have caused subjects to




Table 1: Correlations in the first-price auction










Note: Numbers in parentheses are the theoretical predictions based on the realized valua-
tions of the experiments.
a. Here, leader and follower are as defined in Auction 2.
Table 2: Regression results for the first-price auction
Coef. Std. Err. t P > |t| [95% Conf. Interval]
Estimated with all Auction 1 bids
B11 .800 .005 167.44 0.000 .790 .809
Estimated with Auction 1 bids by leaders in Auction 2
B11 .791 .007 118.82 0.000 .778 .804































Table 3: Bid in Auction 3 of the first-price auction
Frequency (%)
b1 = v2 or v2 + 1





b2 = v2 or v2 − 1
b2 > v2




Note: b1 and v1 denote a leader’s bid and valu-
ation, resp. while b2 and v2 denote a follower’s
bid and valuation, resp.











Conditional on b1 > v2 + 1 Conditional on b1 6 v2 + 1
b′1 ≥ b1
v2 + 1 < b′1 < b1






b′1 > v2 + 1





Note: b′1 denotes a leader’s bid in Auction 2 while b1 denotes his bid in Auction 1,
and v1 and v2 denote his valuation and his follower’s valuation, resp.
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Table 5: Underbids and overbids in the second-price auction
Frequency(%)
Auction 1 Auction 2 Auction 3
Truthful bid 77.3 66.4 58.4
Truthful bid in last 10 rounds 85.5 72.3 62.5
Truthful bid by leader







Truthful bid by non-leader























Overbid by leader in Auction 2







Overbid by leader in Auction 3







Underbid by leader in Auction 2







Underbid by leader in Auction 3







Note: Numbers in parentheses are the expected amounts of overbid or underbid conditional
on the corresponding events.
a. Among the bids falling into this category, about 22% are greater than or equal to the
leaders’ valuations.
b. Among the bids falling into this category, about 11% are greater than or equal to the
leaders’ valuations.
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Table 6: Regression results for the second-price auction
Coef. Std. Err. t P > |t| [95% Conf. Interval]











































































































































Frequency of D := Follower’s bid minus leader’s valuation
conditional on the follower overbidding (%)
D ≤ −16 D = −15
to −6
D = −5




1 48.1 15.4 30.8 7.7 30.8 15.4 0.0 0.0
2 8.3 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3 38.9 0.0 14.3 71.4 14.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
4 0.0 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
5 47.8 36.4 54.5 9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6 91.7 9.1 13.6 31.8 9.1 9.1 9.1 18.2
7 11.1 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
8 4.8 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
9 28.6 66.7 0.0 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
10 0.0 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
11 0.0 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
12 15.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.3 0.0 66.7 0.0
13 9.5 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0
14 4.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
15 15.4 0.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 50.0
16 61.1 27.3 9.1 9.1 27.3 9.1 9.1 9.1
17 45.8 27.3 18.2 45.5 9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
18 56.5 38.5 15.4 15.4 7.7 15.4 7.7 0.0
19 61.9 53.8 38.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.7 0.0
20 57.1 50.0 33.3 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
21 11.1 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0
22 0.0 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
23 13.0 33.3 33.3 0.0 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
24 0.0 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
25 0.0 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
26 30.8 0.0 12.5 12.5 62.5 12.5 0.0 0.0
27 61.9 7.7 7.7 23.1 30.8 30.8 0.0 0.0
28 69.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 93.8 0.0 6.3 0.0
29 4.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
30 0.0 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
31 44.4 41.7 16.7 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.7
32 0.0 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
33 40.0 20.0 70.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
34 65.0 23.1 53.8 23.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
35 5.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
36 90.5 5.3 26.3 15.8 15.8 15.8 0.0 21.1
37 11.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
38 60.9 35.7 14.3 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0
39 37.5 16.7 16.7 50.0 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
40 68.2 6.7 13.3 13.3 53.3 6.7 6.7 0.0
Overall 30.3 23.4 21.6 17.1 19.0 8.9 3.7 6.3
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a. This number is the average of (follower’s valuation plus 0.5).
























Auc. 1 − Auc. 2
Auc. 2 − Auc. 3







a. The null hypothesis that this difference is zero is rejected at 1% level in favor of the alternative
hypothesis that it is positive.
b. The null hypothesis that this difference is zero is not rejected at 10 % level.
























Auc. 1 − Auc. 2
Auc. 2 − Auc. 3







Note: Theoretical values of surplus and revenue are 77.68 and 56.49, resp.
a. The hypothesis that this difference is zero is rejected at 1% level in favor of the alternative
hypothesis that it is negative.
b. The hypothesis that this difference is zero is not rejected at 1% level but rejected at 5% in favor
of the alternative hypothesis that it is positive.
c. The hypothesis that this difference is zero is not rejected at 10 % level.
d. The hypothesis that this difference is zero is rejected at 1% level in favor of the alternative hy-
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Figure 1: Frequency of follower’s bid minus leader’s valuation
conditional on the follower overbidding
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Appendix: Proof of FPBL
We prove that it is an equilibrium behavior for leaders to employ the bidding function in
(1) and for the followers to bid their valuations. Clearly, followers’ behavior is optimal,
if all other bidders follow the hypothesized strategies.28 We now show the optimality
of the leaders’ strategies. When all others follow the suggested equilibrium strategies,
a leader wins only if he outbids the followers in his group and the leaders of the k − 1
other groups. Hence, if a group leader bids b that exceeds the valuations of the followers
in his group, he will win with probability,
y(b) := Prob {max {βm` (v`), vf} ≤ b}k−1
= Prob
{
v` ≤ (βm` )−1(b) =
n−m+ 1

























where F is the cumulative distribution function of the valuation, which is assumed here





b ≥ vf .
It can be easily verified that y(b)(v` − b) is increasing with b for b < n−mn−m+1v` and
decreasing for b > n−m
n−m+1v`, which implies that max{ n−mn−m+1v`, vf} is optimal for the
leader, given that all others follow the hypothesized strategies. We have thus proven
that the behavior described in FPBL constitutes a (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium.
28Recall that ties are broken in favor of the leaders. As mentioned in footnote 7, such a tie-breaking
rule is not needed when the valuations are discrete, as is the case with our experiment.
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